Political connections and the characteristics of the audit committee on the audit quality

ABSTRACT

The goal of this study is to analyze the influence of political connections and the characteristics of the audit committee on the audit quality, as measured by the fees paid to auditors. Although the international literature explores political and auditing connections, there is a lack of studies that address the role of the audit committee as a governance mechanism in the Brazilian context, especially considering its non-mandatory nature for all companies. There is a lack of research investigating how the composition and functioning of this committee, in environments of political influence, affect financial supervision and risk mitigation. The discussion is relevant due to the little evidence on the impact of political connections on auditors independence and financial transparency in Brazil. Understanding these effects is key to improving governance practices and reducing the use of political connections as assets to obtain government benefits. The findings indicate that larger, independent and active committees strengthen oversight, reduce fraud and increase transparency. The results support companies and policymakers in the search for more robust governance. This study is descriptive and documentary, with an unbalanced data panel of 153 public listed Brazilian companies on B3 S.A. - Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão from 2016 to 2023. The study indicates that political connections in the audit committee reduce the quality of auditing in Brazil, in contrast to part of the international literature. Conversely, larger, more independent committees with frequent meetings improve the quality of audits and strengthen governance. Female participation and financial expertise of members are related to lower audit fees. The results highlight the importance of an adequate and efficient composition of the auditing committees.

Keywords:
political connections; audit committee; audit quality

RESUMO

O objetivo do estudo é analisar a influência das conexões políticas e das características do comitê de auditoria na qualidade da auditoria, medida pelos honorários pagos aos auditores. Embora a literatura internacional explore conexões políticas e auditoria, há escassez de estudos que abordem o papel do comitê de auditoria como mecanismo de governança no contexto brasileiro, especialmente considerando sua não obrigatoriedade para todas as empresas. Faltam pesquisas que investiguem como a composição e o funcionamento desse comitê, em ambientes de influência política, afetam a supervisão financeira e a mitigação de riscos. A discussão é relevante devido à pouca evidência sobre o impacto das conexões políticas na independência do auditor e na transparência financeira no Brasil. Compreender esses efeitos é fundamental para aprimorar práticas de governança e reduzir a utilização de conexões políticas como ativos para obtenção de benefícios governamentais. Os achados indicam que comitês maiores, independentes e atuantes fortalecem a fiscalização, reduzem fraudes e aumentam a transparência. Os resultados subsidiam empresas e formuladores de políticas na busca por uma governança mais robusta. Este estudo é descritivo e documental, com painel de dados não balanceado de 153 empresas brasileiras listadas na B3 S.A. - Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão, no período de 2016 a 2023. O estudo indica que as conexões políticas no comitê de auditoria reduzem a qualidade da auditoria no Brasil, em contraste com parte da literatura internacional. Em contrapartida, comitês maiores, mais independentes e com reuniões frequentes elevam a qualidade da auditoria e fortalecem a governança. Já a participação feminina e a expertise financeira dos membros estão relacionadas a menores honorários de auditoria. Os resultados ressaltam a importância de uma composição adequada e eficiente dos comitês de auditoria.

Palavras-chave:
conexões políticas; comitê de auditoria; qualidade da auditoria

1. INTRODUCTION

Given the current situation of capital markets, managers seek high-quality audits as a way to attract investments and present better business performance. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation between ownership and control generates the problem of agency, which causes conflicts of interest between investors and managers. In this context, the agency theory assigns to auditors the function of representing shareholders and reducing such conflicts (Almarayeh et al., 2025; Nerantzidis et al., 2023).

However, the credibility of accounting information has come to be questioned after corporate scandals such as those of Enron and WorldCom, as well as national cases, such as Petrobras, which reported R$ 21.6 billion in losses in 2014, partly associated with the write-off of assets and irregular payments identified in Operation Car Wash. Another relevant example is that of Lojas Americanas, which revealed accounting inconsistencies of approximately R$ 20 billion related to the inadequate classification of bank financing. These events have intensified the demand for improved corporate governance and greater rigor in audits (Khelil et al., 2022). Nevertheless, the perceived quality of audit reflects the strategies and decisions of auditing firms in the face of the political and institutional risks present in each context (Ahmad et al., 2022).

Among the factors that impact on the quality of the audit, political connections, especially the presence of managers related to the political environment, deserve to be highlighted. Literature shows that different types of political ties, such as relationships between board members, large shareholders or executives and public officials, result in different effects on audit decisions and results (Almarayeh et al., 2025; Salehi, 2020; Tantawy & Moussa, 2023; Wahab et al., 2011). This study examines the performance of politically connected managers in auditing committees and the effects on the quality of the work performed. Interpersonal or institutional relationships between executives and politicians directly alter the auditing process and outcomes (Salehi, 2020).

The presence of these managers entails additional costs to maintain such relationships, which increases audit fees and intensifies the perception of risk by auditing firms (Ahmad et al., 2022; Salehi, 2020; Wahab et al., 2011). Despite the evidence, the academic debate still does not present a consensus on the impact of political connections on audit activities and business performance. This scenario is accentuated in emerging markets, where such relations can increase risks or provide institutional benefits (Khelil et al., 2022; Wahab et al., 2015). In emerging contexts, political connections often serve as instruments of access to resources and institutional favoritism. Such relationships influence the choice of auditors, the amounts paid to these professionals, and even the perception of their independence (Almarayeh et al., 2025; Salehi, 2020; Wahab et al., 2011). Previous research observed the effects of these connections on auditors independence (Wahab et al., 2015), audit quality (Almarayeh et al., 2025; Tantawy & Moussa, 2023) and their role in disclosing financial information (Salehi, 2020).

Another determining factor regarding the quality of audits is the audit committee, responsible for advising the board of directors, supervising internal controls, and monitoring the preparation of financial reports. According to the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC), although the creation of an audit committee is not mandatory for all Brazilian companies, the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission recommends this practice for companies listed on the Novo Mercado, state-owned companies, financial institutions and companies with specific regulations (IBGC, 2017).

Several characteristics of the audit committee can influence the quality of the audit. Larger committees demonstrate more power, reduce the cost of capital, and promote improvements in financial reporting (Drogalas et al., 2021). The independence of members decreases the chance of accounting fraud (Larasati et al., 2019), while female participation contributes to more rigorous monitoring, due to a more risk-averse stance (Sellami & Cherif, 2020). Financial expertise is also essential for controlling agency matters (Drogalas et al., 2021), and meeting frequency strengthens committee monitoring and effectiveness (Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023).

Considering the aforementioned, this study poses the following question: what is the influence of political connections and the characteristics of the auditing committee on the audit quality?

This study offers relevant contributions to the Brazilian literature by analyzing the influence of political connections of the audit committee members on the quality of auditing, a topic that is still little explored in the national context. International literature shows that the presence of politically connected members increases audit fees and favors milder opinions, in addition to compromising the auditor's independence and increasing the risks of conflicts of interest (Khelil et al., 2022). These connections also weaken the benefits associated with the presence of independent directors and the financial expertise of members, which counteracts advances in corporate governance and organizational transparency (Almarayeh et al., 2025). In this scenario, it is essential to investigate the influence of political connections of members of the audit committee on the quality of the audit, measured through audit fees in the Brazilian environment.

This study is also justified by examining the characteristics of the audit committee and its relationship with the quality of audit processes, reinforcing the importance of these factors for strengthening governance in Brazilian companies. In addition, the study highlights the relevance of factors such as size, independence, female participation, experience, and frequency of meetings of committee members, which favor the preparation of more reliable financial reports and the choice of qualified auditors (Nerantzidis et al., 2023; Velte, 2023). Despite these advances, literature still presents heterogeneous results on the influence of these characteristics, especially when considering the influence of political connections. Therefore, the joint analysis of these factors broadens the understanding of the determinants of the effectiveness and integrity of audit processes, in addition to offering important subsidies for the development of more solid governance practices in Brazil.

This present study is structured in five sections. Section 1 introduces the topics investigated, Section 2 addresses the theoretical principles and previous studies on the subject, and Section 3 describes the methodology adopted. Finally, Sections 4 and 5 deal, respectively, with the analysis of the data and final considerations.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

2.1 Agency Theory, Political Connections, and Audit Quality

From the perspective of Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), independent auditing is one of the main mechanisms of corporate governance, with a fundamental role in mitigating conflicts of interest between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents). The effectiveness of this mechanism, however, depends not only on the technical competence and independence of the auditor, but also on the robustness of the internal and institutional controls that regulate its actions (Almarayeh et al., 2025).

In this context, the components of the audit committee play an important role, especially when considering the presence of members with political connections. Recent literature shows that politically connected members tend to increase informational asymmetry and hinder the transparency of internal processes, which increases agency costs and weakens governance mechanisms (Ahmad et al., 2022). In less developed institutional environments, such as in many emerging markets, such connections intensify the challenges for the auditor independent action, creating opportunities for opportunistic practices and manipulation of accounting information (Khelil et al., 2022).

In addition, the nature of the audit committee members' political connections may present different configurations or characteristics. According to Khelil et al. (2022), these connections encompass both interpersonal bonds established by lasting social relationships between executives and public officials and the hiring of former politicians or former employees of regulatory bodies to compose the committee. In both cases, companies benefit from the political capital and institutional knowledge of these individuals; however, this privileged access can compromise the auditor's independence and create incentives for practices that aim to preserve private interests (Almarayeh et al., 2025; Khelil et al., 2022).

The presence of politically connected members on the audit committee also directly influences audit fees. Studies show that politically connected managers increase the fees paid to audit firms, either because of the increased effort required to mitigate reputational risks, or because of the need to reinforce rigor in the supervision process (Ahmad et al., 2022; Almarayeh et al., 2025; Wahab et al., 2015). In addition, these additional costs stem from auditors' perception that the political influence of managers can intensify practices of appropriation of private benefits and management of results, which requires greater diligence and caution (Khelil et al., 2022; Wahab et al., 2015).

In the context of internal governance, the actions of audit committee members with a political background may compromise the independence and professional judgment of auditors. The proximity of these members to public agents encourages practices aimed at protecting political and personal interests, to the detriment of the reliability of financial statements (Khelil et al., 2022). Still according to the authors, the political influence of the committee members reduces the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms and makes it difficult for the auditor to act autonomously, increasing the risk of distortions in financial reports.

By contrast, some evidence suggests that firms with politically connected members on their audit committees seek to mitigate negative market perception by hiring large audit firms, such as the Big Four. However, political influence persists as a factor that compromises the auditor's independence, even in the face of the reputation of these firms (Salehi, 2020; Wahab et al., 2011). In fact, literature points out that the political action of these members is associated with an increase in audit fees and a deterioration in the auditor's independence, which undermines the quality of the work developed (Ahmad et al., 2022; Wahab et al., 2015).

Although there is a consensus on the adverse effects of political connections on the part of managers, empirical results are still heterogeneous, especially in contexts outside of Asia, due to the diversity of proxies and methodological approaches (Ahmad et al., 2022; Khelil et al., 2022; Salehi, 2020). In the Brazilian instance, structural factors, such as high interest rates and low financial intermediation, amplify both the benefits and risks of these connections, as they facilitate the appointment of politically favored and low-qualified individuals to strategic positions, which can compromise the efficiency of internal controls and the quality of financial information (Bazuchi et al., 2013).

Therefore, literature reinforces that auditing plays a central role in mitigating agency problems, but the presence of politically connected members on the audit committee limits the auditor's autonomy, weakens its oversight capacity, and compromises the credibility of the financial information disclosed (Khelil et al., 2022; Wahab et al., 2015). The quality of the audit, therefore, depends not only on the technical competence of the auditor, but on the degree of institutional freedom allowing for the independent exercise of its functions (Almarayeh et al., 2025). Thus, when considering the potential adverse effects of politically connected audit committee members on governance mechanisms and the audit function, the following research hypothesis is formulated:

H1: Political connection of audit committee members is positively related to the quality of the audit.

2.2 Characteristics of the Audit Committee and Audit Quality

Economic and regulatory reforms have fostered the evolution of the roles and responsibilities of audit committees (Nerantzidis et al., 2023; Velte, 2023). Previous research demonstrates that the existence of the audit committee, as an additional element of monitoring and control, and its composition can affect audit quality (Velte, 2023). The influence of audit committee characteristics such as size, independence, diversity, expertise and frequency of meetings, promoted by both strict laws (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and flexible laws (e.g., various national/supranational codes of good corporate governance practices), has been of central interest as means of improving oversight of financial reporting, internal control and external audit activities (Nerantzidis et al., 2023).

This research is based on the assumption that the characteristics of the audit committee influence the quality of the audit. This statement is based on studies regarding size (Adelopo et al., 2012; Afenya et al., 2022; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021), independence (Aldamen et al., 2018; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021; Larasati et al., 2019), female participation (Afenya et al., 2022; Aldamen et al., 2018; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Alkebsee et al., 2021; Drogalas et al., 2021; Sellami & Cherif, 2020), financial expertise (Adelopo et al., 2012; Afenya et al., 2022; Aldamen et al., 2018; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Canton & Müller, 2022; Drogalas et al., 2021; Sellami & Cherif, 2020) and frequency of meetings (Adelopo et al., 2012; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021).

Research indicates that the presence of an audit committee drives the improvement of audit quality (Afenya et al., 2022; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021). This is due to the important role that the committee assumes in corporate governance, as it acts directly on issues related to the integrity of financial reporting (Afenya et al., 2022; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Drogalas et al., 2021). Larger committees tend to have more power, which translates into lower capital costs and better quality of financial reporting (Afenya et al., 2022; Drogalas et al., 2021). This rigorous oversight, in turn, would result in greater efforts on the part of external audit and, consequently, higher audit fees (Adelopo et al., 2012; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021).

Independence is a relevant attribute to strengthening the audit committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities and reduce the likelihood of fraudulent financial statements (Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021; Larasati et al., 2019). Independent committees improve on the quality of financial reporting through the use of internal audit and promotion of accounting conservatism (Aldamen et al., 2018; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Drogalas et al., 2021). The ability of these committees to monitor the audit process and preserve the independence of external auditors can lead to the expansion of services, which in turn can result in increased audit fees (Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021).

In addition, the presence of women on the committee has also shown positive results for the quality of companies' audits (Afenya et al., 2022; Drogalas et al., 2021; Sellami & Cherif, 2020). Women in C-suite positions tend to be more risk-averse and complexity-averse, which leads to more rigorous monitoring to protect the company's reputation (Afenya et al., 2022; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Drogalas et al., 2021). This translates into a higher demand for quality audits (Aldamen et al., 2018; Alkebsee et al., 2021; Sellami & Cherif, 2020). Therefore, female participation in committees transcends the issue of gender equality and is configured as a governance issue that requires special attention (Aldamen et al., 2018; Alkebsee et al., 2021). Consequently, committees with a female presence tend to seek higher quality audit information, which requires more services and increases audit fees (Afenya et al., 2022; Drogalas et al., 2021; Sellami & Cherif, 2020).

Regarding the financial expertise of the audit committee members, it is important to highlight their fundamental role in the quality of the audit (Adelopo et al., 2012; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021). According to Adelopo et al. (2012), expertise acts as an essential complement to the effectiveness of the audit committee, by reinforcing its importance as a measure of corporate governance. Members with experience in finance demonstrate greater ability to oversee the financial reporting process, which directly influences audit quality (Adelopo et al., 2012; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021). In the Brazilian context, Canton and Müller (2022) also show that the presence of specialists in the audit committee is related to higher audit fees, which signals a search for more rigorous and higher quality external audits. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that committees with expertise tend to require extensive and rigorous external audits, which can lead to an increase in audit fees (Afenya et al., 2022; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Canton & Müller, 2022; Sellami & Cherif, 2020).

Finally, the frequency with which audit committee members meet can play a significant role in audit quality (Adelopo et al., 2012; Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021). Frequent committee meetings make it possible to prevent fraudulent reporting, reduce resubmission, and increase the likelihood of finding immediate solutions to problems that are meaningfully related to the quality of financial statements (Alhababsah & Yekini, 2021; Drogalas et al., 2021). Thus, audit committees that meet more frequently tend to supervise the financial reporting process rigorously, which causes the external auditor to perform broader and more detailed work and, consequently, raise audit fees (Adelopo et al., 2012; Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023), evidenced in this research as an indication of audit quality.

Based on the arguments presented and the results of the empirical research reported, the second research hypothesis is formulated subdivided among the characteristics of the audit committee.

H2a: The size of the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit.

H2b: The independence of the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit.

H2c: Female participation in the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit.

H2d: The expertise of the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit.

H2e: The frequency of audit committee meetings is positively related to the quality of the audit.

3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES

This study was done through descriptive and documentary research, with a quantitative approach, whose population comprised of public listed companies on B3 S.A. - Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3), except for those designated in the economic sectors as "Financial and Others" or "Holdings of Non-Financial Institutions", due to the specificities of its activities. Companies in the process of judicial reorganization or liquidation, as well as those that do not have an audit committee, were also disregarded.

The final sample size consists of an unbalanced data panel, of 636 observations from 153 companies in the period from 2016 to 2023. The choice for the year 2016 as the starting point of the time series is justified by the decision by the Federal Supreme Court to recognize that donations from companies violated the principles of political equality and democracy, by exerting disproportionate influence on the electoral process. This decision was later incorporated into electoral legislation through Law No. 13,165, of September 29, 2015, which came into force in the 2016 elections and defined a new regulatory framework for campaign financing in Brazil. The sectoral distribution of the sample is detailed in Table 1.

Table 1
Sample of the survey

Sector	Quantity	Observations per year
		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Industrial Products	18	2	2	2	4	9	10	13	17	59
Communications	5	0	0	1	1	3	5	4	5	19
Cyclical consumption	44	8	10	14	15	25	32	36	38	178
Non-cyclical consumption	18	5	7	8	9	12	16	15	16	88
Basic materials	14	4	4	3	5	9	11	11	13	60
Oil, gas and biofuels	6	1	1	1	2	3	5	3	5	21
Healthcare	17	7	8	8	9	11	10	10	12	75
Information Technology	12	1	1	1	2	7	10	12	11	45
Public utility	19	6	6	10	11	14	13	17	14	91
Total	153	34	39	48	58	93	112	121	131	636

• Source: Prepared by the authors.

The investigation used data from 2016 to 2023. However, not all 153 companies listed in Table 1 were present in all the years of the sample. This limitation stems from three main factors: (1) some companies went public during the analyzed interval, becoming part of the sample only after the event; (2) the database used to obtain the audit fees did not provide this information for certain years; and (3) in some cases, despite the formal existence of an audit committee, the companies did not provide sufficient data on their composition, with records of only one or two members, when the minimum required is three (IBGC, 2017), which made it impossible to include these observations in the sample. Due to the intermittent presence of some companies in the sample over the years, the data was treated and analyzed from an unbalanced panel data model.

3.1 Variables and Data Collection

Data collection used secondary sources from two main repositories. The first source corresponds to B3’s website, through the Reference Form and the companies' Standardized Financial Statements, which provided information on audit fees, audit committee, political connections and control variables. The second source refers to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU) website, responsible for complementing the necessary information on political connections. The variables considered in the study, as well as their source, are detailed in Table 2.

Table 2
Relationship of variables and source of collection

Variable	Description	Collection	Source naming	Source
Panel A: dependent variable
QUA	Quality of the audit	Natural logarithm of total audit fees.	Reference Form: Auditors.	B3 website
Panel B: Independent variable
CP	Political connection	1 if there is at least one member of the audit committee listed in the CGU's PEP, 0 otherwise.	Registration as PEP at the CGU.	CGU website
		1 if there is at least one audit committee member declared as a PEP on the Reference Form, 0 otherwise.	Reference Form: Composition of the Committees.	B3 website
TCA	Size of the audit committee	Total members on the audit committee	Reference Form: Composition of the Committees.	B3 website
ICA	Independence of the audit committee	Proportion of independent members on the audit committee
MCA	Female participation in the audit committee	Proportion of women on the audit committee
ECA	Audit committee expertise	Proportion of members with financial expertise on the audit committee
RCA	Audit Committee Meetings	Total audit committee meetings
Panel C: Control Variables
END	Debt	The ratio of total liabilities to total assets	Standardized Financial Statements	B3 website
REN	Profitability	The ratio of total net income to total assets
TAM	Company size	Natural logarithm of total asset

• B3 = B3 S.A. - Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão; CGU = Comptroller General of the Union; PEP = politically exposed person.
• Source: Prepared by the authors.

The process of classifying members of the audit committee with political connections consisted of identifying politically exposed people (PEP), initially using the database provided by the CGU. This database provides information such as the individual's name, position, function, entity, start and end dates of the position, as well as the date on which the individual ceased to be classified as a PEP. Based on this information, the members who were included in this database were classified as PEP, through their Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas (CPF) numbers. In addition, through the Reference Form on B3 website, the members' PEP declaration was verified. However, in order to avoid biases in the analysis, it was decided not to present the number of members and the percentage of political participation in each company, as the objective was to verify whether at least one member of the audit committee had political connections.

3.2 Data Analysis Procedures

To reach the objective of the research, data analysis was done, starting with the use of descriptive statistics, the calculation of Pearson's correlation coefficient and evaluation of collinearity between the variables analyzed. Then, to examine the proposed hypotheses, the generalized least squares (GLS) method, using the Stata software was applied to the panel, with robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity between panels and unit-specific first-order autocorrelation.

The choice for this technique is based on its ability to deal with "[...] a known structure of variance of errors (heteroscedasticity), serial correlation pattern in errors, or both, through a transformation of the original model" (Wooldridge, 2023, p. 816). This strategy allowed the testing of hypotheses H1 and H2 through the analysis of the following econometric equation:

$${\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{A}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}}=\mathrm{}{\mathrm{\beta }}_0+{\mathrm{\beta }}_1{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{P}}_{\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}}+\mathrm{}{\mathrm{\beta }}_2{\mathrm{S}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{C}}_{\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}}+\mathrm{}{\mathrm{\beta }}_3{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{C}}_{\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}}+{\mathrm{\beta }}_4{\mathrm{F}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{C}}_{\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}}+{\mathrm{\beta }}_5{\mathrm{E}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}}+{\mathrm{\beta }}_6{\mathrm{M}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{C}}_{\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}}+{\mathrm{\beta }}_{\mathrm{k}}{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{V}}_{\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}}+{\mathrm{\epsilon }}_{\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}}$$ (1)

where QUA refers to the quality of the audit as measured by audit fees, CP is the political connection of the audit committee members, SAC is the size of the audit committee, IAC is the independence of the audit committee, ECA is the female participation in the audit committee, ECA is the expertise of the audit committee members, and MAC corresponds to the number of audit committee meetings. As for the control variables (CV), DEB is the company's debt, PROF is the company's profitability and SIZE is the size of the company.

4. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

For the descriptive statistical analysis of the indicators, several measurements were extracted, including the minimum and maximum values, means as measures of central tendency, standard deviations and coefficients of variability as measures of dispersion. In addition, Pearson's correlation calculation and variance inflation factor (VIF) test were done to detect possible multicollinearity problems. The results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3
Descriptive statistics, Pearson's correlation and collinearity

Panel A - Descriptive statistics
Variables					Minimum	Maximum	Average	Standard deviation	Variance	Asymmetry	Kurtosis
Quality of the audit					8.456	17.942	13.838	1.315	1.730	-0.208	1.702
Political connection					0	1	0.140	0.347	0.121	2.081	2.337
Size of the audit committee					3	7	3.327	0.705	0.498	2.411	5.930
Independence of the audit committee					0	1	0.190	0.258	0.066	1.468	1.849
Female participation in the audit committee					0	1	0.156	0.205	0.042	1.083	0.383
Audit committee expertise					0	1	0.626	0.365	0.133	-0.542	-1.058
Audit Committee Meetings					0	41	0.668	2.953	8.723	9.684	113.640
Debt					5.227	387.661	61.669	29.692	881.618	4.765	43.363
Profitability					-78.744	36.186	2.881	9.252	85.597	-2.249	14.097
Size					11.491	20.773	15.570	1.567	2.457	0.344	0.392
Panel B - Pearson 's correlation and collinearity
Pearson's correlation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	VIF
Quality of the audit (1)	1
Political Connection (2)	0.158**	1
Size of the audit committee (3)	0.253**	0.179**	1
Independence of the audit committee (4)	0.190**	0.083*	0.032	1
Female participation in the audit committee (5)	-0.028	-0.022	-0.023	0.006	1
Audit Committee Expertise (6)	-0.071	-0.044	-0.061	0.061	0.003	1
Audit Committee Meetings (7)	0.100*	0.253**	-0.018	-0.034	-0.058	0.023	1

• VIF = variance inflation factor.
• * = significant correlation at the 5% level; ** = significant correlation at the 1% level.
• Source: Prepared by the authors.

According to the data presented in Table 3, it can be noted that, on average, 14% of the sample contains companies with political connections. Furthermore, regarding the characteristics of the audit committee, it can be noted that the size varies between three and seven participants, which denotes that this number can influence the fact that larger boards are better monitors and facilitate transparency. Regarding the independence of the committee, it can be noted that 19% of the sample has independence, a fact that helps in monitoring the main managers in environments with agency conflict. However, as for the other characteristics, it can be noted that, on average, there is not a significant number of women in the audit committee, contrary to the expertise and the number of meetings, whose percentages are higher and can impact the quality of the audit, as they are linked to financial knowledge and greater monitoring of the audit committee's actions.

Regarding asymmetry and kurtosis, only the size of the company presented values that meet the parameters of normal distribution (between -1 and +1) for all groups. In panel data regression, it is not necessary to assume that the data follow a normal distribution (Fávero & Belfiore, 2017); therefore, no observations were excluded from the sample. The data will be discussed and analyzed in the subsequent sections, which cover the analysis of the research model proposed in this study, supported by the literature review.

Regarding the verification of multicollinearity, it was found that there is no significantly high Pearson correlation between the variables, that is, none presents a correlation greater than 85%, which dismisses concerns that could compromise the results of the panel data regression model with the independent variables in question. In addition, when performing the VIF, the values obtained were lower than 5, which indicates the absence of multicollinearity between the independent variables (Fávero & Belfiore, 2017). These results reinforce the feasibility of using both the political connection and the characteristics of the audit committee in this study simultaneously to assess the quality of auditing in companies with an audit committee listed on B3.

4.1 Model Evaluation and Analysis

Table 4 presents the results of the regressions estimated using the GLS method for panel data. To ensure the robustness of the estimates, the model was adjusted for heteroscedasticity between panels and specific first-order autocorrelation per unit, in addition to the inclusion of fixed effects of year, in order to control for possible temporal influences. The heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests showed high levels of statistical significance, which reinforces the adequacy of the GLS model for the correction of the analyzed data. Such methodological approach is more appropriate, as it allows for consistent and efficient estimates even in the presence of violations of the classic assumptions of linear regression, such as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2023).

Table 4
Results of the relational model of the research

Quality of the audit	Expected signal	Coefficient	T-value	P-value
Constant		6.008	39.500	0,000**
Political connection	+	-0.226	-3.680	0,000**
Size of the audit committee	+	0.142	10.380	0,000**
Independence of the audit committee	+	0.749	16.530	0,000**
Female participation in the audit committee	+	-0.091	-2.100	0,036*
Audit committee expertise	+	-0.136	-5.940	0,000**
Audit Committee Meetings	+	0.020	3.830	0,000**
Debt	-	-0.001	-2.840	0,005**
Profitability	+	-0.003	-3.090	0,002**
Size	+	0.492	60.390	0,000**
Fixed effect of the years	Yes
Wald Chi-Square	8,059.91**
Modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity	352,735.48**
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation	14.22**

• * = significant correlation at the 5% level; ** = significant correlation at the 1% level.
• Source: Prepared by the authors.

The results of this research provide relevant contributions to the understanding of the factors that influence the quality of auditing, measured by the natural logarithm of fees paid, in companies with an audit committee listed on B3. The analysis reveals that the presence of members with political connections on the committee exerts a significant negative influence on the quality of the audit, suggesting lower rigor and quality in the audit processes in these situations.

On the other hand, structural characteristics of the audit committee increase the audit fees and indicate a higher quality of the service provided, given that this study measures the quality of the audit through the variable fees. Committees composed of a larger number of members, with greater independence and frequent meetings, favor more robust and insightful audits, resulting in higher amounts being paid for the service. While other aspects of the committee have an inverse relationship with the quality of the audit. Greater female participation and increased expertise signal lower quality audits in these contexts. Within the scope of control variables, both the debt and profitability of the companies' assets negatively influence the quality of the audit, while the increase in company size significantly increases the amounts paid to the audit.

In summary, the findings demonstrate that larger, more independent, and more active audit committees promote the hiring of higher quality audits. In contrast, the presence of politically connected members, greater female participation, members expertise, debt, and profitability exert a negative influence on the quality of the audit. Therefore, the profile and composition of the audit committee play a central role in corporate governance and in the definition of audit quality standards in the organizations analyzed.

4.2 Results Discussion

The discussion of the results of the research is based on Table 5, which presents the synthesis of the decisions related to the hypotheses tested.

Table 5
Summary of the results of research hypotheses

Research hypotheses	Result
H1: Political connection of audit committee members is positively related to the quality of the audit.	Rejected
H2a: The size of the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit.	Accepted
H2b: The independence of the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit.	Accepted
H2c: Female participation in the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit.	Rejected
H2d: The expertise of the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit.	Rejected
H2e: The frequency of audit committee meetings is positively related to the quality of the audit.	Accepted

• Source: Prepared by the authors.

Although international literature mostly indicates that the presence of members with political connections on audit committees suggests an increase in audit quality due to greater scrutiny and risk perception by auditors (Ahmad et al., 2022; Almarayeh et al., 2025; Salehi, 2020; Tantawy & Moussa, 2023; Wahab et al., 2015), the results of this research contradict this understanding, and hypothesis H1 was rejected. This finding can be interpreted considering evidence suggesting that, in certain institutional environments, political connections not only fail to strengthen monitoring mechanisms, but can also weaken them. As Khelil et al. (2022) and Wahab et al. (2015) argue, political influence tends to compromise auditor independence, allowing politically connected members to exert greater influence over the audit process, even pushing more favorable reporting.

Furthermore, in contexts in which political capital overlaps with reputational capital, the mere presence of political connections may signal less rigor in internal controls and less willingness from auditors to confront the interests of these members (Ahmad et al., 2022; Khelil et al., 2022). In the Brazilian context, this dynamic is even more complex. According to Bazuchi et al. (2013), the Brazilian institutional environment is characterized by high state intervention, recurrent patterns of institutional capture and strong dependence on resources and benefits arising from the relationship with the governmental apparatus. Thus, the results indicate that, unlike what is generally observed in countries with more robust institutional structures, the presence of political connections in the audit committees, in the Brazilian context, can compromise the effectiveness of monitoring, reduce the scope and depth of audit procedures and, consequently, deteriorate the quality of the audit. This finding highlights the importance of considering institutional and contextual specificities when analyzing the effects of political connections on corporate governance and organizational control mechanisms.

The second research hypothesis, composed of five sub-hypotheses focused on the characteristics of the audit committee, presented different results. Sub hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2e were accepted, while H2c and H2d, although statistically significant, presented a contrary signal to what was expected and, for this reason, were rejected. Regarding hypothesis H2a, its acceptance is supported by several studies that identify a positive relationship between the size of the audit committee and the quality of the services provided.

From the perspective of the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), more numerous committees expand oversight capacity, which reduces conflicts of interest and information asymmetries between managers and shareholders (Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023). Alhababsah and Yekini (2021) and Drogalas et al. (2021) highlight that the increase in the number of members on the audit committee provides a greater diversity of skills and experiences, in addition to expanding the available knowledge, factors that increase the quality of control over the financial reporting processes, even in emerging countries, such as Jordan. Adelopo et al. (2012) found that audit committees with a larger number of members, by composing more robust governance structures, promote more effective and rigorous auditing practices. Similarly, Al-Okaily and Naueihed (2023) found that larger committees result in greater scope and quality of audit services, reflected in higher audit quality. Therefore, the Brazilian result is in line with that observed in other emerging markets, demonstrating that more extensive audit committees favor rigorous and transparent practices, in addition to strengthening corporate governance and stakeholder confidence.

Considering hypothesis H2b, it is evident, based on the agency theory, that the presence of independent members on the audit committee acts as an effective mechanism to protect the interests of shareholders, as it limits the influence of management and reduces opportunistic practices, by providing greater rigor and objectivity in the supervision of financial information (Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2023; Drogalas et al., 2021; Larasati et al., 2019). Larasati et al. (2019), when analyzing companies in Indonesia, show that the performance of independent directors in the audit committee increases the demand for greater coverage and scope in audit work, which results in more detailed services and higher quality in the analyses performed. In the Greek context, Drogalas et al. (2021) reinforce that the independence of the committee allows for more effective oversight of internal and external processes, which raises the quality standard of audits. Al-Okaily and Naueihed (2023) point out that the independence of the committee expands the scope of action of external auditors, favors the adoption of more robust auditing practices, and increases stakeholder confidence in the financial statements. Thus, the Brazilian result is in line with that observed in other markets, even in emerging countries such as Indonesia, which confirms that the independence of the audit committee strengthens corporate governance and raises the quality of audit services.

This study H2c hypothesis postulates that female participation in the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the audit. However, the results reveal a negative relationship between the presence of women on the audit committee and the quality of the audit, which leads to the rejection of the hypothesis. This result diverges from the evidence of Aldamen et al. (2018) and Sellami and Cherif (2020), who point to a positive and significant relationship between diversity in the audit committee and audit quality, by suggesting that the presence of women increases the demand for audit services and, consequently, quality. While this study is in line with the findings of Afenya et al. (2022) and Drogalas et al. (2021). These authors argue that the presence of women can strengthen the monitoring and efficiency of committees, reducing the need for additional effort on the part of auditors and thus audit costs. In the Brazilian context, this result reinforces the relevance of institutional and cultural specificities when analyzing the impact of gender diversity on audit quality.

For H2d, the results contradict the studies by Adelopo et al. (2012), Al-Okaily and Naueihed (2023) and Drogalas et al. (2021) in which financial expertise improves audit quality. Despite the expectation of a positive relationship, there are cases in which the financial experience of the audit committee does not have significance in determining the quality of the audit, due to the complexity of the regulatory environment and specific practices of the industry or country in consideration (Drogalas et al., 2021). Although the results do not directly confirm the expected relationships, it contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of audit committees in audit quality.

Finally, hypothesis H2e, which proposes a positive relationship between the frequency of audit committee meetings and audit quality, is accepted by the results. This suggests that the frequency of audit committee meetings can be interpreted by the market as a sign of the company's commitment to corporate governance. According to Adelopo et al. (2012), this perception can lead to a greater demand for quality audits. Therefore, audit committees that meet more frequently demonstrate greater diligence in fulfilling their audit monitoring and oversight functions. Such diligence results in a closer monitoring of the work of external auditors, which can lead to the scope of services and, consequently, to higher fees (Drogalas et al., 2021), a fact that makes sense in the present study because it uses this variable as audit quality. In addition, such committees tend to be more effective in detecting fraud and errors in financial statements, as highlighted by Al-Okaily and Naueihed (2023), motivating external auditors to conduct additional testing and more rigorous procedures, resulting in higher audit quality.

5. CONCLUSION

This study, based on the agency theory, analyzed the influence of political connections of members of the audit committee, as well as the characteristics of the entity, on the quality of auditing in companies listed on B3. The results showed that the political connection of the members of the audit committee is negatively related to the quality of the audit, contrary to part of the international literature, which suggests a positive effect of these connections. In the Brazilian context, the presence of politically connected members tends to weaken monitoring mechanisms, compromising the effectiveness of the audit committee and, consequently, the quality of audit services.

In this sense, it is highlighted that the characteristics of the Brazilian institutional context, such as greater state intervention and the strategic use of political relations, can be determining factors to weaken corporate governance mechanisms, by compromising the auditor's independence. Furthermore, in relation to the agency theory, the study progresses by demonstrating that, even with the internal mechanisms of corporate governance, there is still the influence of institutional and political pressures that can compromise its effectiveness.

Regarding the characteristics of the audit committee, the study revealed that the size of the committee, the independence of its members and the frequency of meetings are positively related to the quality of the audit, corroborating the literature that points to the importance of these factors in promoting more robust governance practices. Larger committees with a higher proportion of independent members expand oversight capacity and reduce conflicts of interest, while the greater frequency of meetings indicates greater diligence and monitoring of audit activities, which tends to increase fees and, consequently, perceived quality.

In contrast, the female participation and financial expertise of the audit committee members did not demonstrate a positive association with the quality of the audit in the context analyzed. Specifically, the presence of women on the committee presented a negative relationship with the dependent variable, which may indicate the adoption of more effective monitoring practices, capable of reducing the demand for additional efforts from auditors. Regarding financial expertise, the results did not show a significant impact on the quality of the audit, possibly due to institutional factors and characteristics of the Brazilian regulatory environment. Thus, it is noted that institutional and cultural factors of the context may be able to influence the way these characteristics impact on the auditor's work, in addition to possible differences in risk perception with regard to auditing firms.

Thus, the study contributes to the literature by showing that, in the Brazilian context, political connections tend to weaken the quality of auditing, while the size, independence and frequency of audit committee meetings are factors that strengthen corporate governance and promote the improvement of the quality of audit services. The results also offer practical insights for companies and policymakers, by highlighting the relevance of careful composition and effective functioning of audit committees as means to reinforce the credibility of financial statements.

Among the limitations of the study, the analysis restricted to companies that have an audit committee stands out, which may limit the generalization of the results to the total universe of companies listed on B3. In addition, the use of audit fees as a quality proxy may not capture all the dimensions of this concept; therefore, it is suggested that other measures be tested. The analysis period was also limited, mainly due to legislative changes that impacted the measurement of political connections. For future research, it is suggested to broaden the scope to include companies without an audit committee, test other quality proxies, and consider longer periods, especially segmenting by electoral cycles and regulatory changes, to deepen the understanding of the determinants of audit quality in Brazil.

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• This is a bilingual text. This article was originally written in Portuguese, published under the DOI https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x20252308.pt
• This article is derived from a doctoral thesis defended by the author Alice Carolina Ames under the supervision of the author Paulo Roberto da Cunha, in 2023.
• Paper presented at the 24^th USP International Conference on Accounting, São Paulo, SP, Brazil, July 2024.
• DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
  The entire dataset supporting the results of this study can be made available upon request to the authors.
• AI NON-USE STATEMENT
  The authors declare that no generative artificial intelligence was used in any stage of the production of this manuscript (including research, writing, data analysis, formula generation, or the creation of graphic elements).
• FUNDING
  The authors are grateful to the following institutions for funding this research project: - Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES). Case number: 88887.475225/2020-00.

Edited by

• Academic Editor-in-Chief:
  Andson Braga de Aguiar

• Ad Hoc Associate Editor:
  Guillermo Oscar Braunbeck

Data availability

The entire dataset supporting the results of this study can be made available upon request to the authors.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  10 July 2026
• Date of issue
  2026

History

• Received
  25 Feb 2024
• Reviewed
  18 Mar 2024
• Accepted
  10 Sept 2025