Open-access Discussing the critiques of the mathematization of economics: an economist’s perspective

Discutindo as críticas à matematização da economia: a perspectiva de um economista

ABSTRACT

The subjectivity and quantification, assumptions on a non-static mechanism, and value-free sciences are critical to account for the disfavor of the mathematization of economics. These elements are essential to argue because economics involves subjective human behavior and is a non-static mechanism that cannot be accurately quantified, making it difficult for economics to conform to the value-free nature of science. This paper discusses several ideas of particular importance from which economics should be viewed and dealt with. This paper suggests that the mathematization of economics should not be seen as a tool to equate economics with other pure sciences.

KEYWORDS:
Mathematization of economics; subjectivity; quantification; evolutionary process; value-free science

RESUMO

A subjetividade e a quantificação, as premissas sobre um mecanismo não estático e as ciências livres de valor são cruciais para explicar a desaprovação da matematização da economia. Esses elementos são essenciais para argumentar por que a economia envolve comportamento humano subjetivo e é um mecanismo não estático que não pode ser quantificado com precisão, dificultando a conformidade da economia com a natureza livre de valor da ciência. Este artigo discute diversas ideias de particular importância a partir das quais a economia deve ser vista e tratada. Este artigo sugere que a matematização da economia não deve ser vista como uma ferramenta para equipará-la a outras ciências puras.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE:
Matematização da economia; subjetividade; quantificação; processo evolutivo; ciência livre de valor

1. INTRODUCTION

The use of mathematics in economics has been debated for quite some time. While some argue that it is relevant, others criticize it for being too scientific or too ambitious to make economics supposedly more scientific. The criticism was voiced by Wolf (2019) who stated that economists should stop pretending to be scientists and go back to the core of the discipline, as it is a field of inquiry and way of thinking. Accordingly, economists should blend with other forms of political and social expertise. The forms of expertise that combine social and political arrangements to think the human world works and not simply attach science to itself, when in fact it is only scientism. This situation implies that the application of scientific apparatus ignores the substance of the problem rather than revealing a better scientific discipline in addressing the intellectual and policy challenges facing society or humans.

In line with such argument, the opponents of mathematics in economics claim that distorts economic phenomena rather than helps us to comprehend them. For instance, Hudson (2023) justified the matter by saying that mathematical economics is a distraction from economic reality. There are also several important points discussed by renowned economists to strengthen the justification. In general, they believe that formalism or scientism in economics can mislead interpretations and diverge economic peculiarities (Hayek, 1945, 1967; Mises, 1966; Georgescu-Rogen, 1977; Coase, 1982; Mirowski, 1988; Haavelmo, 1989; and Marshall, 2013). They believe that mathematics is less reliable or appropriate in dealing with the complex processes of economic phenomena.

Economics is not a static, timeless, or perfect discipline, rather it is organic, alive, and constantly evolving and creating itself. Therefore, economists should examine economic reality or phenomena with new insights and more complicated approaches by engaging in multidisciplinary or transdisciplinary knowledge. This would involve using a variety of perspectives and approaches to analyze economic phenomena as suggested by Durlauf (2012), Sandel (2013), and Arthur (2023).

However, for the proponents, the mathematization of economics is indispensable for pursuing economics as so-called scientific economics. In general, they argue that using mathematics in economics is more precise and complete than using ordinary language to explain economics. According to Mill (1851), Jevon (1888), Fisher (1929), Samuelson (1952), and Debreu (1991) mathematics is a tool used to measure and explain economics. Mill (1851, p. 262) claimed that the science of numbers (arithmetic and calculus) is the primary instrument for transforming experimental science into deductive science was the science of numbers. Jevon (1888, p. 3) stated that if economics wants to be a science entirely, it must be mathematical. Indeed, Jevon (1888, p. 3) emphasized that since economics deals with quantity, the law of economics must be mathematical whenever the thing indicates more, less, or greater. The words “more, less, or greater” essentially imply that economic phenomena should be measured numerically. This numerical measurement is instrumented by mathematics and expressed for “scientific” or adding “scientificism” in economics.

According to Fisher (1929), mathematics is used in economics when the economic relationship needs to be expressed scientifically. Fisher believed that literal language was imprecise and incomplete. Samuelson (1947, 1952) also argued that the mathematization of economics was a significant effort to bring scientific rigor to the field. Samuelson (1952, p. 57) believed that mathematics played a crucial role in finding empirical facts, and then deduction helped to pursue scientific truth. Debreu (1991, p. 4-5) further supported this view by stating that economic theory could be efficient and open to scrutiny for logical errors by formalizing it in mathematical form. Therefore, the proponents of the mathematization of economics have made extensive efforts to refine economic deliberation with the help of mathematics, which plays a modest linguistic role in translating empirical hypotheses into logical equivalents.

The paper aims to discuss the arguments against the mathematization of economics. It reviews the disagreement of economists about subjectivity and quantification, assumptions, and free-value science. The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction, the paper briefly looks at the mathematization of economics from the perspective of formalism and scientism. It proceeds with the discussion of the disagreement on the mathematization of economics. A conclusion is in the final section.

2. FORMALISM IN ECONOMICS AND THE OBJECT MATTER OF ECONOMICS

The mathematization of economics is about the use of mathematics for the exposition of economic theory, economic research, and economic prescription. Debreu (1991) posited the mathematization of economics as the contribution of mathematics in theorizing and analyzing economics. The mathematization of economics is linked to formalism and scientism in economics (Sorell, 1991; Blaug, 2003; Solow, 2005).

Formalism in economics states that mathematics is necessary to pursue axiomatization and conclusions based on non-intuitive analytical techniques and models. Blaug (2003) said formalism in economics relied on mathematical modeling to achieve the complete axiomatization of economic theories. Solow (2005) posited economics formalism as acquiring conclusions in economics using analytical techniques, most of them non-intuitive, the kind of analysis that must be studied diligently by economists talented in mathematics.

Meanwhile, scientism is a system of thought holding that science is the only valid knowledge to solve all human problems. Sorell (1991) defined scientism as placing too much of a scientific value on natural science compared with other branches of learning or culture. Thus, economics as a form of “scientism” can be the extent to which scientific methods are comprehended for solving economic problems. Katzner (2003) pointed out the importance of mathematics in economics, among others (1) to attain a decent scientific standard or scientific respectability and (2) to facilitate an assurance concerning claims of truth, coupled with the significance of the data and its implications for scientific inquiries. However, the points are elaborated differently by its critiques, which creates gaps in understanding the roles of mathematics in economics. For instance, Hausman (1992) discussed that economics was an inexact science. Hausman (1992) added economic phenomena were the effects of numerous causes, and many causes were not encompassed by theory.

Concerning effects and causes, some economists insist that addressing economic phenomena is not just a simplification and proof by a stylized model. Therefore, considering economic peculiarities and complexity encompassing economic and social interaction is essential for understanding economic issues. Robinson (1969, p. 64) disagreed with a formal or stylized model as an instrument for explaining economic behavior. She posited that a stylized model only includes some focuses, where only a few simple details were used to get a picture of “real and complex” economic behavior. Furthermore, Sandel (2013, p. 138) said that the more economic thinking extends the scope and reaches into social and ordinary life, the more market reasoning becomes inseparable from moral reasons. In this sense, economics should inquire more rather than just asking for market reasons, optimality, and equilibrium.

Mathematics is closely related to positivism or logical inquiry. In this sense, mathematics is a tool to find out the empirical evidence through which it helps construct any postulation. It happens when the philosophy of science apprehends mathematics to approach and later prove any proposition and construct a postulation. To prove this, mathematics relied heavily on subjectivity and quantification, assumption, and free-value reasoning. The proof of economic phenomena through mathematical modeling is sensible, but it is rarely devoted to the welfare of society in a real sense. As opposed to that, we discuss the views of prominent economists who disfavor that matter. They perceive economics as a concrete reality with a complex system characterized by non-static mechanisms that never find equilibrium. They understand the economics shaped by social and institutional contexts. The ones that are more realistic than the standard economic assumptions. Thus, the object matter of this study inherently is humans and society, which implies complexity, non-subjectivity, and the content of value judgment. These are indeed the objects of criticism as discussed by the opponents of the mathematization of economics.

3. AMBIGUITY OF SUBJECTIVITY AND QUANTIFICATION

Subjectivity is the understanding that everyone has their perspective and beliefs, which can be influenced by contexts such as personal ideas, opinions or feelings, rather than facts. It is a sort of interpretation, which come from your knowledge, opinions or feelings, but not proved yet or should be proved. As opposed to the subjectivity of economics, economists claim that economics should be quantified, thus absolutely objective. In practice, utility functions, market equilibrium, and other economic concepts describe objectivity.

The concept of subjectivity has different meanings for scientists and economists. Subjectivity refers to thinking about a subject or the matter of a subject. Meanwhile, quantification is a method of measuring or quantifying the subject, for instance, utility, marginal propensity to consume, and others, that governs the behavior of decision-makers and market participants. Quantification constitutes numbers, digits, indexes, rankings, and so on to examine and convey phenomena and realities. In economics, such concepts imply that economics allows human behavior (the object) to be measured in terms of numbers.

Bresser-Pereira (2009) deliberated the historical-deductive method to oppose the objectivity of economics. The core reason is it is impossible to deduce the law governing the natural sciences like economics. Historical senses principally create conditions that, in turn, change individual preferences, making the methodology of individualism does not well-function. This implies that we can’t reduce complexity to model the reality content of social sciences. In this vein, Davis (2023) elaborated problematic consequences of avoiding a historical-deductive method: (1) value blindness regarding the range and complexity of human values and (2) fatalism regarding human behavior in employing a tenseless rather than tensed representation of time. Rather, economics is a form of science that is inseparable from the practices of open science, which treat the “view from somewhere” conception of economics as a science - complexity modeling, mixed methods, strong links to other disciplines, and value diversity - provides the foundation for a socially and historically embedded conception of the individual. The fact that many arguments favoring the economic phenomena are objective, or subject to hypothetical-deductive method, is in fact irrelevant to the study of economics, because economic phenomena cannot be understood without recognizing and consistently applying value subjectivity (Bylund, 2023).

The utility theory is subjective, subject to thoughts, feelings, desires, or opinions through which the maximum satisfaction of a commodity is accounted for. Similarly, other concepts such as terms of trade, the poverty index, the elasticity of demand and supply, and others tend to be biased. The concepts as argued are difficult (if not impossible) to quantify in numbers due to the sense of subjectivity inherent in their nature. Veblen (1909) and Downey (1910) criticized the idea of cardinal utility. Accordingly, both considered subjectivity was precisely immeasurable and insisted the phrases “pleasure” and “pain” (unpleasantness) need to be assessed psychologically. When we are dealing with human beings, we need a little more humility, and a little more understanding of the importance of substance or things which cannot be numerically measured.

The flaw in mathematization of economics is fundamental, in which quantification of utility, utility maximization, and other numerical ratios are inevitably subjective and difficult to be quantified. The most obvious problems regarding such measurements relate to interpersonal comparability and quantifying preference. Sen (1970, p. 4) pointed out that the use of interpersonal comparison is thought to be arbitrary but many people could not deny that the comparison is meaningless. Van Praag (1989, p. 41) in his conclusion said that the concept of utility which is commonly apply in welfare economics is relative and it may be applied to the measurements and quandaries of other concepts such as wealth, education level, age, expenditures, and commodity price. It seems clear that both authors agree that in order to reliably apply for interpersonal comparison, we have to apply or accept reasonable measurements related to human behavior.

Some economists, including Shiller (2013) claim that mathematics in economics provides a sense of practicality. Economics is not a matter of practicality and performance. Considering mathematics in economics for practicality will even leave things with improper judgments. Economists may suffer to a high degree from the scientificity they made, which scientificity just does not look to the public to be solidly based. Principally, it is because economics does not study any unit smaller than a collection of people. Bresser-Pereira (2009) emphasized that the object of economics is economic systems, which the general equilibrium model had little deliberation in explaining concrete economic realities. It does not work as well as the public wants and economists have claimed. Economists claim a certain scientific status. But much of it looks to the outsider more like “scientism” - the use of an incomprehensible intellectual apparatus to obscure ignorance rather than reveal truth.

Since the adoption of quantification or computation in economics, economics has been dominated by big ideas and complex theories, but with little attention paid to the facts of people’s lives. What should be in economics is the quality of assessment in addressing any economic issue. The quality of assessments of the merits relies on how powerful a judgment can be judged by how well it can explain and persuade the whole context of the issue hold solutions, and provide the most forthright. The quality of such assessment is necessary to hinder the economics from the danger, that the economics will become secondary, if not marginal, in that judgment. This is a perception that many economists worry about. Mathematics in economics tends to make economics a blackboard science that leaves out its dynamics.

Coase (1982) introduced “blackboard economics” to outline his views of qualitative and institutional matters that cannot be completely dismissed in economics. Indeed, Coase (1982) criticized economists for sketching economic dynamics on a blackboard using certain equations or models. What Coase said was modeling the economy simply by drawing a small part of the real world. This expresses the belief in considering comprehensive knowledge or sources to recognize multi-faceted dimensions beyond the judgment of subjectivity and quantification in economics. Involvement in such a belief is a requisite. Parker (2001) criticized economists for formalism and over-reliance on quantification in discussing economic theory and analysis. Additionally, Moosa (2017, p. 46) was concerned about flawed policies by the inaccuracy of measurement and quantification. Moosa (2021, p. 46) added that it was because of some modifications including unrealistic assumptions to fit economic theory from a mathematical standpoint.

Furthermore, Saltelli et al. (2021) proposed the ethics of quantification and observatory knowledge to hinder harm in policy decision-making. The ethics is aimed at investigating the relevance of quantification and promoting vigilance about the potential of numerical indexes to inflict damage on society. Meanwhile, observatory knowledge implies applying transdisciplinary solutions and different problem settings via case studies for comprehending the world. Dow (2018) emphasized that pluralism provides a variety of analyses to illuminate a complex, evolving reality, making economics at a disciplinary level more reliable. By assessing the limits, Davis (2022) stated that the interdisciplinary static model should be geared by a pluralistic multidisciplinary approach for analyzing a complex discipline like economics. Consequently, the model constructed by subjectivity and quantification would erode the reliability of economic analysis and evaluating policy.

In economics, we should not apply a full quantification approach necessarily to derive economic solutions or policies. The economic policy is convincing proof of human behavior in general. Human behaviour can never be predicted or explained absolutely. Human behavior is multidimensional, while quantification seems to look such the matter as one-dimensional. We will not be able to remove the biases formed from the surroundings and other situational factors that shape human behavior. Such conditions cannot be counted or quantified to build a generalization. Horne (2024) said as people are affected by various biases, their surroundings, as well as other situational factors, we cannot be confident in our findings if the research relies on self-reporting or take place in a setting that is too dissimilar from the real-world context. Although we have succeeded in identifying human behavior in one particular place, it may not apply in other places. For example, if we are exploring how people make lunch decisions in a cafeteria, then the research should ideally happen in the cafeteria itself. In this vein, your observational identification in that cafeteria will not necessarily apply in other places in other countries. Thus, in the economic behavior context, quantification would be very difficult, if not impossible to address economic policy.

Indeed, understanding human behavior is required to comprehend the economy. Dore (2002) stated that some requisites must be met if mathematics were to serve successfully as a basis for economic interpretation. Furthermore, Dore (2002) said economic analysis must be corrected through a constructivist approach. Facing a multi-faceted environment, economic constructivism builds knowledge rather than passively absorbing numerical information. Morson and Schapiro (2017) posited economists would benefit greatly if they broadened their focus. We should deal with humans as it does and learning from other spheres could not only construct analysis to be more realistic but also make policy stances more effective and constructive.

4. ASSUMPTIONS ON THE NON-STATIC MECHANISM

Human behavior cannot be predicted or explained in the same way as the measurement of ratios, indices, or other forms of quantification applied in pure sciences. Economics is rooted in its environment and other spheres, where it will change in continuous and irregular dynamics.

Veblen (1898) said economics was not evolutionary. Veblen described the economy as not an evolutionary process or a static mechanism. Rather, it is a complex system involving social spheres such as psychology, politics, and anthropology. Veblen insisted that such an evolution did not mean that economics functioned by ordered or regular movements. Similarly, Beinhocker et al. (2019) said as it was subject to learning, adaptation, evolutionary, and coevolutionary processes, the economic system was constantly changing, self-creating, and never at rest. As a result, economics never finds itself in an equilibrium state. Arthur et al. (2020) posited the economic system was not necessarily in equilibrium but rather one where agents constantly change their actions and strategies in response to the outcomes they mutually create. Again, Arthur (2023) described the system as organic, always creating by itself, and alive, brimming with messy vitality. So, if the economy is not best thought of as a mechanism that can return to equilibrium and follow fixed laws of motion, should we think economics be assessed numerically? Furthermore, can the assumptions set in the model deal with economic issues that are complex, dynamic, and evolving in nature? How realistic is the assumption to explain equilibrium and so on?

Utmost, economics is not all about precise results set by assumptions. Using assumptions to control dynamic processes is impossible. Setting certain assumptions in the economic analysis of a phenomenon will only depict the situation unrealistically. Schabas (1989) quoted Marshall as saying mathematics would drive economics away from realism. Gaus (2007) viewed the use of consequentialist criteria for policy evaluation, in which the failure to consider the complexity fundamentally limits the ability of a policymaker to predict policy consequences. Also, Wilson (2016) posited pursuing economics to genuine scientism like physics and mathematics leads to a false conception of human nature, so it must be replaced with a more realistic concept.

Contrary to the authors, Samuelson (1952) asserted it was enough to explain economic issues by the language of mathematics. The language that is articulated by symbols in a model. This language cannot be challenged. As Samuelson (1952) postulated a model cannot be challenged because of a mechanism called model defeating, a process that carefully guards against ridiculous or inappropriate interpretation. Samuelson’s claim has been challenged as models are simplified and sometimes fail to take into account factors that turn out to be important. Economic systems are much more complex, and assumptions to simplify such complexity will make us realize how dubious such assumptions to be applied in developing economic policies and decisions.

Economists should be feared that if economic ideas or regularities bounded by certain assumptions (Higgs, 2011). If this happens to the policy analysis, for the reasons of a systemic nature, it will implicate serious adverse on the success of policy-making decisions. As policy analysis is deemed a public virtue in general, the assumptions made in the economic analysis do not capture the social realm, so using mathematics as a “language” is somewhat discouraged. Blaug (1998) posited that modern economics suffers from the overuse of mathematical models with more attention to rigor than content. Shiller (2010) said economics differs from physics as the discipline was harder to conceptualize. Also, Heilbroner (1999, p. 317) noted economics cannot be like a pure science because the social life of humans is inherently political.

Such differences are very significant considering the relativity of human behavior. Since ordinary experience is subject to the effects of the circumstances on a percipient human being, economics must examine ordinary experiences to encompass the relations of things or events between themselves. Since economics deals with human behavior, the difference between an ordinary worldview and a scientific worldview implies that the economist cannot ascertain agents’ behavior solely by studying what things are but needs to tap o ur ordinary outlook as fellow human beings.

Economists should be much more aware of the particularities of economics. Economics must be served in its realm, within which the writ of qualitative justification and effective policy is conceived to run. Hayek pointed out such incompatibility on several occasions. For instance, Hayek (1945, p. 519) said that mathematics does not provide proper and complete answers to economic problems. This is because the data obtained to calculate economic problems will never proficiently calculate the whole of society (which is the object of study), and fairly to say to know its implications. Additionally, Hayek (1945, p. 519) mentioned that the characteristics, as well as the solution of rational economic problems, are determined by the fact that the knowledge of the situations we are supposed to use never exists in an integrated form, but merely as scattered parts from incomplete and often contradictory knowledge that individuals all separately possess.

Hayek again emphasized the need for acquiring multiple pieces of information to answer the relativity of human behavior. Hayek (1967) asserted that economists should treat the object of their studies from complex perspectives. Hayek (1974) highlighted such a matter, mentioning that economists face methodological problems when adopting the natural sciences approach to address economic issues. Both statements demonstrate that when we use mathematics to address complex phenomena, we confront an inappropriate method for the task at hand.

Economists should be overly concerned with economic peculiarities. They need to recognize the peculiarities, which not be addressed by the logic of mathematics. As it is in mathematics, the deductive-axiomatic method has worked just fine. In its nature, human behavior is erratic, and not all of our actions can be justified purely with logic. Besides, human behavior can be influenced by various factors, including culture diversity, different physical spaces, and multi-level social relations. In this matter, we abide a statement by Mitchell (1914, p. 3) who did not deny that human nature is in large measure a social product, in which their social activities that shape it the most fundamental is the particular set of activities deal with economic matters. Thus, conflating those two domains of knowledge has been one of the most fundamental mistakes made in modern economics.

Similarly, applying it to real-world open systems immediately proves it to be excessively narrow and hopelessly irrelevant. It is what Haavelmo (1989, p. 15) queries about the possibility of extracting information from observation of the world, which is depends on good economic theory. In this regard, Haavelmo (1989, p. 15) questioned whether a good society could be built by any mathematical tricks. This is his statement:

The task of econometrics from the point of view of human welfare is to try to extract from past data useful information for whatever economic society it should be found desirable to reach for. Let me hasten to clear up one thing in this connection. The question of what is that the good society cannot be settled by any mathematical tricks (Haavelmo, 1989, p. 15).

If we read wisely this statement, many people would agree that economics is a matter of comprehending the way it works, but it could not be addressed by so-called mathematical tricks. In line with this, Coase (1982) rebuked economists cannot deal with systemic change because they do not study the workings of the economic system with all their relationships but rather constitute the social system with given assumptions. In this context, the question of what constitutes a good economic theory is essential in justifying how the economic works, rather than providing assumptions to simplify the matter. In this vein, Haavelmo (1989) then addressed the issue by mentioning that the existing society and set of rules and regulations were more suitable for a deeper understanding of the economic outcomes.

This matter has been presented by Georgescu-Roegen (1979). Georgescu-Roegen (1979) argued the trouble with economics is methodological: the attempt to explain an essentially qualitative, entropic, and irreversible process by applying the Newtonian method which had been developed to study passive objects existing in a purely abstract, reversible time. This situation was further conveyed by McCloskey (2005) who claimed that although, these techniques are mathematically consistent, there is little experimental evidence that corroborates economic theory and reality.

Economic mathematics has been tyrannical over economics by attempting to simplify what are inherently complex and multidimensional processes into a few simple mathematical equations. This tyranny has ignored the essence of logical economics itself. Mises (1966) mentioned that logical economics is essentially a theory of processes and changes. It resorts to the imaginary constructions of process solely for the elucidation of the phenomena of change. However, it is different from mathematical economics, in which its equations and formulas are limited to the description of states of equilibrium and nonacting or passive objects. In sum, the main deficiency of mathematical economics is not the fact that it ignores the temporal sequence, but that it ignores the operation of the market process.

Understanding the outcome requires knowledge of the spheres of economics. Economists must debate the possibilities and benefits of policy implementation to deal with economic issues qualitatively and within the interdependence and implication context accordingly. Rather, relent their obsession with mathematics. They must spell out the non-equilibrium process that does not take the economic object or properties as fixed or proved by figures. Mathematics does not know about implications, linear models and calculus will never be able to provide a solution. Mises (1966, p. 710-15) pointed out such a pessimistic view that the static prices mathematically imputed from perfect knowledge of the economic data would not lead to a dynamically efficient allocation of resources. Rothbard (2009) emphasized that economists were framing admittedly false or partly false assumptions, which they hope can serve as useful approximations, as they would in physics. These views consider the most sophisticated mathematical formulas are not a guarantee to a better outcome obtained by society.

The excessive use of mathematics obscures the essence of economic theory itself. Hayek (1945, p. 1-2) claimed that the core problems of economic theory arose, where they have been obscured rather than illuminated by many refinements aided by mathematics. Furthermore, Hayek (1945) mentioned that many current disputes concerning economic theory and economic policy stem from misconceptions about society’s economic problems. Accordingly, the substance on which the economist works is economic and social. It should compel the substances inherent in economics to be fully evolutionary and not to be framed by assumptions. Economists should not serve “the normal course of things” by mathematics, preventing a more general discussion of economic conception. It is as reflected by the statement:

From the perspective of definitive formulation of knowledge, a process of change was gradual; the perception is shared by all sciences, though to an unequal degree, and the change is going forward. Economics is not an exception to the rule, but it (economics) still shows too many reminiscences of the “natural” and the “normal”, of “verities and tendencies”, of “controlling principles” and “disturbing causes” to be classified as an evolutionary science (Veblen, 1898, p. 6).

Veblen (1857-1929) introduced the concept of evolutionary science, which mean that economic behavior is determined both by individual and society as a whole. It is so called the evolutionary mechanism, which operates over systems and population of rules, i.e., institution to produce the change, and it will be a continuous process of change. In this vein, Hodgson (2019) said evolutionary economics is broadly concerned with how economic change occurs, and is focused on innovation and entrepreneurship, industrial and institutional dynamics, and on patterns and trends as they relate to economic growth and development. Veblen himself as quoted by Wible (2021) said in his 1898 essay, criticized the applications of mathematics and statistics and thus the mathematical economics of his time had become predominantly ill-suited for understanding evolutionary processes. In the context of the evolutionary economics, one of the most important questions that economists need to answer is whether mathematical models with static assumptions can solve such complex situations.

Evolutionary mechanism is considered on a continuum over time and as a phenomenon that is unfolding, stakeholders are engaged in a practice of evolution where we have to accept the mechanism everything cannot be measured and applied by rigorous mathematical models. Accordingly, Metcalfe (1998) said an evolutionary process in which the focus is upon economic change and not economic equilibrium. He claimed that:

Innovation-driven economic processes are open-ended with the economy never in equilibrium, or even close to equilibrium... Outcomes are to be discovered, not presumed in advance of an event (Metcalfe, 1998, p. 8).

Previously, Metcalfe (1998, p. 5) presented two central issues in the evolutionary process: (1) the causal mechanism which produces different behavior patterns in a class of entities, and (2) a dynamic process of selection which resolves these different behaviors into emergent pattern of change. In relation to economics, these two issues pessimistically can be solved by mathematization of economics. In this line, Hayek (1945, p. 83) posited that knowledge is dispersed, and a person possesses only a fraction of subjective interpretation of the time and place, knowledge is also often tacit of the kind that by its nature cannot be penetrated by statistics. Also, Buchanan (1991, p. 18) implied the failure of statistics in dealing with economic issues by questioning how empirical evidence can be convincing when such evidence must be perceived from only one vantage point. Both economists were pessimistic that the conditions and process by which statistics and mathematics acquire knowledge and penetrate a certain understanding of predictive control cannot be expected to confirm the theory in a qualitative sense.

Economic behavior cannot be compared to a substance whose behavior can be modeled by deterministic processes as pure sciences perceive. Any economic theory or model, even to make it the least true to reality, requires far more complex modeling than the physical theory in which mathematical economists always take inspiration from natural scientists. Not surprisingly, the critics and cynical views say it is a mistake to “flaunt” and try to be the physics of social science. Such cynicism is notable, especially linked to predictions or forecasting of economic relations. Marget (1929, p. 313) pointed out Morgenstern’s (1928) methodology in the following three points:

  1. Forecasting in economics using economic statistics was “essentially” impossible.

  2. Although economic forecasting techniques can be developed, such techniques are incomplete, therefore, they will not be usable in real situations.

  3. Such predictions cannot be used for useful purposes. Thus, all attempts to develop formal techniques for prediction are discouraged.

In this vein, when conducting a forecast, it is important to criticize assumptions that govern the model. It should be noted that once such an assumption simplifies the complexity, it may create unrealistic circumstances in the model. This makes the assumption jeopardy the truth. Hicks (1980, p. 2) posited that no one can attach that degree of certainty to any economic prediction. Then, Hicks (1980, p. 4) said if we were able, at some points, to understand the significance of uncertain knowledge, we could proceed from that to incorporate or reach the case of near-certain knowledge, solely by minimizing (rather than eliminating wholly) the level of uncertainty.

It is impossible to make predictions of economic events because human behavior is non-evolutionary. In his statement, Mises (1966, p. 867) asserted that predicting the future is beyond the power of any mortal man. This view is reasonable as any prediction or forecast can only be worked if similar events are repeated periodically. If we adhere to the “realism” of the assumptions in revealing causal forces at work in the economic system, thus it is doubtful to accept the predictions themselves.

Forcing the economy to be mathematics means squeezing the whole economic process of society, which is valid for all countries. Such things are impossible. Shepard (1987) confirmed that prediction can never attain the precision of living things as it was proper to observe celestial objects. One of the strong arguments about this is believing that forecasts can easily break down due to random elements that cannot be incorporated into a model, or they can be just plain wrong from the start. In this matter, economists should accept human hedonistic psychology. Therefore, forecasts on marginal propensity to consume, marginal propensity to save, and others are invalid due to the non-monotonic function of human behavior or a single unvaried pitch level in movement, which has random elements on human actions and reactions.

In sum, economics considers human interaction with their fellows within its complex environment. Economics is about descriptive views, in which different people, groups, and societies have different perspectives or opinions about right and wrong, good and not good, truth and falsity, and so on. Economics is not about economic equilibrium, but the focus is upon economic change. This view implicitly elucidates a relativity of the situation, i.e., determining for better or worse. As such, there are coexisting explanations for affirmative answers, which are difficult to resolve by mathematical formulations or models.

5. ECONOMICS IS NOT A VALUE-FREE SCIENCE

A value-free science is a science that is not entitled to value judgments. Economics is not a value-free science. In a value-free science like physics or mathematics, an analysis is aimed to demonstrate the ultimate proof of the matter. Mirowski in many occasions including Against Mechanism (1988) claimed the application of mathematical methodology and propositions seem like physics demonstrate the failure of economists to consider the limitation of these disciplines in a discipline economics. Unlike both sciences, economics is goal-oriented, which aims to address economic problems and realize goals with normative consideration. Besley and Hennessy (2009) emphasized that if economists peer at the world through an overly mathematical framework, they may be unable to analyze and address problems with the interdisciplinary sensibilities and “collective imagination” that economists have been utilizing since the field’s inception.

The use of logic in answering economic problems needs to be reconsidered. This is because economic concerns are also part of human concerns. Dispelling normative consideration is tantamount to allowing lameness in dealing with human concerns. Normative science is not based on presuppositions and assumptions derived from the two main sources of positivist logic: synthetic knowledge (empirical science) and analytical knowledge (logic/mathematics). Economics is normativism, in which facts and values are often inseparable. Indeed, in Moral Sentiment for instance, as Corning (2012) said that Smith argued that a moral framework and cooperation are essential prerequisites for a successful society. Marshall (2013, p. 23) admitted the importance of mathematics in economics, but it should not neglect ethical considerations. He posited ethics, instincts, and senses were the ultimate arbiters between economics and other sciences.

In this vein, Davis (2022, p. 15) said people form expectations about economics based on their belief that economic life affects their lives and well-being, which rely on values to judge what they mean ought to be scientific responsibility. Also, Georgescu-Roegen (1977) insisted that economic theory be grounded in the forms of biophysical reality and social phenomena, which significantly do not suffice to be described by purely mathematical formulation. Furthermore, Hayek (1974) warned economists of the dangers of what he termed “scientificism” in which economic research is subject to mathematical models. Hayek (1974) also advised economists should not create or shape the results of their studies and that economic scientism is not to subjugate human nature. As Hayek said:

If a man does not do more harm than good, he must learn to improve the social order. As in other fields, the complexity must be under consideration. That is because he cannot acquire the full knowledge that would allow mastery (over that knowledge). Therefore, he must learn what he can achieve, not to shape or create the result as a craftsman does, but to cultivate and nurture plants by providing a suitable environment. That is the way gardeners ought to treat their plants (Hayek, 1974).

The statement considers that achieving economic goals, such as human welfare does not rely on precise mathematical formulas but on how economic men cultivate life with proper treatments. Hausman and McPherson (1996) disagreed that economics is a value-free science by conceiving the importance of values in analyzing economic policy or prescription. Mises (1966) also denied economics as value-free and placed it as praxeology (moral science), in which values or morals were justified. In this vein, Ward (1972, p. 172) asserted that economics was fundamentally a normative policy science, in which empirical proof of facts through positivism or positive science has not been a notable feature of economics. Furthermore, Krugman (2009) worried that economists seek to demonstrate their mathematical prowess, but the entire field of economics went astray because they mistook the beauty of mathematics for truth. Rodrik (2011) blamed not economics as such but economists for unjustified confidence in their ideas and models.

The aforementioned describes how the economic research agenda should be materially organized, how researchers identify themselves and interpret what they do, be embedded and tested under prevailing dynamics, and be consistent with the value-goal of economic studies. This is an aspect where economists must be cautious about the mathematization of economics. Mises (1966) mentioned that manipulating a given quantitative data creates the so-called arithmetic problem. The problem implies that manipulating data to adjust the mathematical models in economics could lead to inaccuracies in the description of the subject matter analyzed. In this vein, Georgescu-Roegen (1977) stressed that mathematical and quantitative analyses are indispensable for economic analysis. However, they neglect structural changes and imaginative-mechanical descriptions in their nature. The excessive use of mathematics would eliminate the substantive in looking at economic phenomena. In this sense, the commitment of economists to primary individual sub-field investigation based on mathematics becomes unfounded to analyze the real existence and policy standpoint in economics. Georgescu-Roegen (1979) was concerned that mathematics would develop “arithmomorphic model”.

The applicability of the analytical models that represent similes of actual processes (any qualitative change) cannot be denied. But what matters most in the case of evolutionary structures is the emergence of novelties due to qualitative changes. The analysis cannot be represented solely by an arithmomorphic model (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979, p. 325).

This statement implies that economists have no other solution but dialectical for explaining structural change. Economists should consider literary explanations instead of numbers for analyzing qualitative change or policy standpoints. A literary explanation is necessary to deal with the situation described by Davis (2001, p. 127):

... in any economic analysis, we cannot assume or be solely concerned with certain types of agents, for example, individuals or classes as in the individualist methodology. We cannot say that some agents will automatically retain or maintain the status of being agents across different spheres of activity. Yet, the agents are changing whether at a point or across time.

To explain why and where the structural change happens, we should look for representative features or examples of how they interweave for a veridical or accurate description of the subject matter to be represented. Therefore, the construction of a veridical description should engage real-world relationships. Georgescu-Roegen (1977) revealed that an accurate description of market exchange and policy recommendation would be blunt unless they rely upon the biophysical and social contexts of consumption and production. Any social contextual exclusion would only result in superficial reasoning, capturing a limited knowledge for explaining economic phenomena. Economists should not understand the phenomena by oversimplifying and expelling the context for pursuing the analytical results known in advance.

The excessive use of mathematics and oversimplification of the economic issue bear implications for the economy. Novick (1954, p. 357) asserted that the role of mathematics in economics was most unfortunate. Minsky (1992) mentioned that focusing solely on a limited scope and favoring certain things based on mathematical formulations only leads to market instability and collapse. It is relevant for validating the relationships of how reality works at first, instead of reducing them to mathematical forms. Georgescu-Roegen (1986) asserted that any economic theory must be a logical and structured description of reality. It should be subject to an explanation of reality. It is necessary to study relations within a broad perspective that can place them in a proper and current context, proceed to the feedback system, and be tested under prevailing dynamics and consistent with the value-goal of economic study.

Dealing with economic issues in the context of a free-value science and numerical consideration seems to place the behavior of conscious humans in a static and standstill state. Economics is difficult to articulate in the form of mathematical modeling that is universally accepted. Mathematics is analogized as a knowledge that cannot articulate social complexity. As Hayek (1988) argued men only know little about what they imagine they can design, as society is far more complex than we realize, with little pieces of knowledge dispersed among millions of individuals. Similarly, Marshall (2013, p. 5) reminded us that economics is not comparable with the physical sciences for it deals with ever-changing and subtle forces of human nature. Pigou quoted the reminder in the following statement:

Though a skilled mathematician, he used mathematics sparingly. He (Marshall) saw that excessive reliance on this instrument might lead us astray in pursuance of intellectual toys. Imagination does not match the factual situation and distorts our sense of proportion by causing us to ignore factors that are not easily engaged in mathematical machines (Pigou, 1956, p. 84).

Here, Marshall considers the mathematical models to distort the factual situation. Since the mathematics of economics is not enough to tip the scope of economics, prescribing linear models on economic issues or phenomena would only allow for what is known as performative science. This performative science creates perils for the policy, that is, straying the objective of “fixing” the world to “changing” the world. Fixing the world is what it usually has on our minds, and it is not impossible to shift to changing the world through mathematical machines geared toward economic and social policy.

Mathematical prescriptions possibly change “real” economic goals to aspiring “new” ones. The ones that actively reconstruct the world or find something to “rebuild” the world through policy changes and institutional designs that incentivize behavior to fit the theory. That is something naive in the context of humanity and science.

In the real world, we often even try to “fix” the existing state of the world. Economics is not looking for something performative and adjusting it accordingly to the needs and personal interests. Something “performative” may bring greater risk to the community and is unsuitable for moral justification. In this vein, Hayek (1942) stated that economics was not a science, it should not strive for scientific status and not follow the pure scientific method. Hayek (1974) believed that some of the gravest errors of recent economic policy were a direct consequence of scientific error. Rodrik (2024) responds to the situation by saying that in economics, the valid answer to almost any policy question is “it depends” not “a fixing by rules of thumb”.

It is unarguable that economists often come across as pronouncing universal laws that hold for society or countries, regardless of context. Rodrik (2015, p. 11) said that rather than a single, specific model, economics encompasses a collection of models. It seems clear that the discipline steps in the right direction by expanding its library of models and by improving the mapping between these models and the real world. The diversity of economic models is essential to meet the discussion of complexity and the flexibility of the economic circumstances. As Rodrik (2015, p. 11) viewed different social environments require different models. Thus, economists are unlikely to ever find a universal, general-purpose model.

6. CONCLUSION

Economics is a discipline tied in with a set of common qualitative values. Economics is a multi-perspective science, not just numerical confirmation proof by setting up certain assumptions. Subjecting and quantifying economic phenomena will only obscure our economic understanding. Complexity economics or a transdisciplinary perspective is justified to construct reliable knowledge to address issues and policy stances. Analyzing economic issues using quantification and mathematics to economic men under optimization, maximization, or equilibrium is akin to incomplete knowledge. In this light, economics is not a free-value science in which tacit knowledge and value judgments must be addressed.

As arguments by renowned economists pointed out that treating economics as “a pure science” would ignore the bits of reality we ask for and study. Reality is the object we should know more about. We should adhere to economics more as a method of thinking for wielding a solution to address economic issues. In practice, being too formalistic, abstract, and negligent of the world (reality) is detrimental to the economist. If economists are solely lustful in proving or fitting mathematical models, mathematics has helped enthrone irrelevance in economics.

Economists must apply a wider range of justification and utilize interdisciplinary perspectives when analyzing current economic issues and attempting to predict future economic situations. Capturing the complexity of human behavior is mandatory to consider the economic phenomena as well as not overreliance on purely mathematics. If economists oversimplify the way through which people interact with their environments and one another, they will not be able to accurately predict the trajectory of the economic worldview - and will, therefore, be unable to meaningfully address the economic issues or phenomena.

STATEMENT ABOUT DATA AVAILABILITY

Research data is only available upon request to the researcher.

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JEL Classification:

A12; B40; B41; B59; C02.

Publication Dates

  • Publication in this collection
    24 Oct 2025
  • Date of issue
    2025

History

  • Received
    13 May 2024
  • Accepted
    21 Jan 2025
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